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This paper analyses the effects of education signals for Ethnic Germans and Germans
without a migration background (“Native Germans”). We base our analysis on a sorting
model with productivity enhancing effects of education. We compare whether the sig-
nalling value differs between the migrants and non-migrants in the German labour market.
Starting from the theoretical result that only a separating equilibrium can exist, we ﬁnd sub-
stantial empirical differences between Ethnic and Native Germans with the same formal
education level. This empirical analysis is done with a completely new dataset based on
administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency.
Zusammenfassung
Das Papier analysiert die Auswirkungen von Signalen über das erreichte Bildungsniveau
von (Spät-)Aussiedlern und „übrigen Deutschen“. Die Analyse beruht auf der Sorting-
Theorie mit produktivitätserhöhenden Effekten der Bildung. Aus dieser theoretischen Ana-
lyse folgen vier Hypothesen, inwiefern sich die Bildungssignale zwischen den beiden Grup-
pen unterschiedlich auswirken sollten. Diese Hypothesen werden mittels einem von uns
neu zusammengestellten Datensatz zu (Spät-)Aussiedlern anhand der Prozessdaten der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit empirisch getestet. Die empirische Analyse steht im Einklang mit
allen Hypothesen.
JEL classiﬁcation: J24; J31; F22
Keywords: Sorting theory; human-capital theory; returns to education; migration
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For a long time, many Germans did not consider their country as a mayor destination for
immigrants. However, in 2005 7.3 million people or 8.9 percent of the population were
foreigners. Using a broader deﬁnition of migration by looking at people with a migration
background, e.g. someone whose parents immigrated to Germany, then at the end of
2005 there were 15.3 Million such people living in Germany. This corresponds to 18.6
percent of the population.1
However, with regard to labour-market performance, migrants generally fare less well than
Germans without a migration background. For example, the unemployment rate of for-
eigners in 2005 was 25.2 percent which was more than twice the rate for Germans which
was “only” 11.9 percent (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2007: Table 7.2).2 One of the key
factors to labour-market success as in all highly industrialised countries such as Germany
is undoubtedly the level of education a person has. In 2005, the unemployment rate of
individuals with no vocational training was 26.0 percent, whereas it was only 4.1 percent
for those with a degree from university or technical college (Reinberg/Hummel 2007).
Due to data limitations, the vast majority of studies for migrants in Germany are based
on an analysis of people of different nationalities. However, Germany has also received a
substantial amount of migration of so-called Ethnic Germans ((Spät-)Aussiedler) who often
grew up for example in Poland, Romania or the former Soviet Union but have German roots
and are hence allowed to migrate to Germany. Between 1990 and 2004 roughly 2.5 million
Ethnic Germans migrated to Germany. As they receive German citizenship immediately
after crossing the German border, they are the only migration group apart from EU-15
migrants with an unrestricted access to the German labour market. In addition, they are
also the only migration group with a legal claim that the German authorities verify whether
all of their foreign certiﬁcates, i.e. also those for occupations which have no legal protection,
can be converted into German equivalents. Hence, at least from a legal perspective, the
labour-market chances should be very similar between Ethnic and Native Germans.
Due to their German citizenship, the Ethnic Germans can normally not be unambiguously
identiﬁed in the data. The exception are studies based on the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) (see for example, Aldashev/Gernandt/Thomsen 2007, Constant/Massey
2003, Kreyenfeld/Konietzka 2001, Licht/Steiner 1994 or Riphahn 2002, 2003, 2005). Un-
fortunately, for our purposes, the GSOEP does not have detailed enough information on
the labour market. Instead, we create a completely new and extremely rich dataset based
on administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für
Arbeit - FEA).
This paper analyses the effects of education signals for Ethnic Germans and Germans
without a migration background (“Native germans”) respectively. Intuitively, one might ex-
pect that, after controlling for other personal as well as occupational characteristics, the
1 All of the above ﬁgures come from Statistisches Bundesamt (2007: Table 1).
2 These rates can only be calculated based on the number of civil employees. Hence, for example, the
self-employed are not included. As a result, these rates are higher than ofﬁcial unemployment rates.
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grounds should be the same. Our results clearly show that this is not the case. We ﬁnd
substantial and robust differences between Ethnic and Native Germans with equal and
high formal education levels.
Generally, there are two main explanations in the economics of education literature for the
positive link between the level of education and wages: the human capital theory based
on Becker (1975) and the signalling/screening (collectively known as sorting) theory which
was originally developed by Spence (1973, 1974). Human capital theory focuses on the
productivity augmenting effects associated with education. Sorting theory assumes that
the educational level signals certain characteristics that a person has. For example, if an
employer knows from past experience that highly-educated individuals have more innate
ability, then this is a characteristic that he or she cannot directly observe when hiring the
employee but is willing to reward if he or she is able to obtain the information indirectly.
This information is inferred from educational signals which act as a proxy for expected
productivity.
It is often argued that sorting theories assume no productivity enhancing effects of educa-
tion. To this extent there is a huge amount of literature which tries to test which of the two
theories is correct by trying to separate empirically the purely productive enhancing effects
of education (which are then assumed to support the human-capital theory) or the purely
sorting effects of education in which education is assumed to leave productivity unaltered
but is associated with other positive characteristics.3
We want to stress the point that there is no reason to assume that there are no productiv-
ity enhancing effects of education in sorting models. Therefore, in Section 2 we present
a sorting model which explicitly takes such effects into account. Both the sorting model
and the human capital approach imply that wages rise with the level of education. There-
fore, as both human capital models and sorting models predict the same empirical result
Brown/Sessions (1999) argue convincingly that it is – especially for empirical purposes –
quite redundant whether education augments skills or signals innate abilities. Along sim-
ilar lines, Lang (1994: p. 353) states, “the distinguishing characteristic of a sorting model
is that knowing an individual’s education provides employers with information about that
individual’s productivity which would be unknown otherwise.”
3 For example, there are studies based on comparisons between workers in dependent employment and self-
employed people in terms of years of schooling published by Wolpin (1977), Riley (1979), Katz/Ziderman
(1980), Fredland/Little (1981), Tucker (1985), Cohn/Kiker/Mendes de Oliveira (1987), Grubb (1993), Alba-
Ramirez/Segundo (1995), Brown/Sessions (1999, 1998), Lofstrom (2000), van der Sluis/van Praag (2004),
Castagnetti/Chelli/Rosti (2005) and Garcia-Mainar/Montuenga-Gómez (2005). Psacharopoulos (1979,
1983), Lee (1980), Tucker (1986) and Cohn/Kiker/Mendes de Oliveira (1987) compare the rates of return to
schooling between the competitive and the non-competitive sectors of an economy. Liu/Wong (1982) meas-
ure the effect of tenure. Alba-Ramirez/Segundo (1995), Arabsheibani/Rees (1998) and Brown/Sessions
(1999) ground their research on comparisons between public and private sector workers. The decompos-
ition of earnings is studied by Tucker (1985). Albrecht (1981) and Albrecht/van Ours (2006) analyse the
relationship between the returns to schooling and job information. Studies using data of identical twins have
been published by Miller/Mulvey/Martin (1995, 2004). Wiles (1974), Miller/Volker (1984) and Arabsheibani
(1989) base their analysis on comparisons between the salaries of workers in occupations relevant to their
educational qualiﬁcation to those with the same qualiﬁcation working in jobs not directly related to their
qualiﬁcations.
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human-capital theory. On the contrary, there are numerous similarities between the two: In
both theories wages are paid according to marginal productivity, ﬁrms maximise their proﬁts
and individuals their utility, the marginal beneﬁt of education equals the marginal costs and,
as can be seen from the model in Section 2, in both cases more education is associated
with higher productivity. However, whereas human-capital theory tries to isolate the effects
of education on productivity solely due to differences in education (and not differences in,
for example, innate abilities), sorting theory implies:
“...if workers’ productivities are in fact not perfectly observed (which is particularly
true for newly hired workers), then the ﬁrms would have to infer the productivities
[...] from noisy signals such as interviews, tryouts, and reference letters together
with their education levels.” Fang (2006: 1154)
I.e. as already mentioned above, ﬁrms need to form expectations about productivities
based solely upon observable characteristics. This in turn has important implications for
our empirical analysis as what we are wanting to estimate is not the rate of return on
education. Instead, it is the ex ante employer beliefs about how innate abilities are related
to education and hence productivity. Thus, sorting theory implies that:
“The coefﬁcient on education is fully capturing the effects of that inference process
and would not be affected by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that are
not observed by the ﬁrm. Even if the researcher knows the results of accurate tests of
attributes like perseverance or a taste for additional learning, if the ﬁrm does not have
that direct information available, then the sorting model predicts that including these
variables in the wage equation will not affect the coefﬁcient on schooling” (Weiss
1995: p. 135f.).
This theoretical implication is also in line with the huge body of evidence on the rates of
return to education (see Card 2001 for a comprehensive survey). Table II in his article
shows that the difference in the coefﬁcients on education between OLS estimates (which
do not take unobservable innate abilities into account) and IV estimates (which do try to
take them into account) can be small and not signiﬁcant.4 Recently, Gebel/Pfeiffer (2007)
have also estimated returns to education and compared OLS with the conditional mean
independence approach developed by Wooldridge (2004). Again, although there are some
differences in the two results, the general picture between the two is very similar.
The objective of this paper is therefore not to prove whether the sorting or human-capital
approach prevails and to which extent both theories apply. Hence, we do not want to further
contribute to this long debate. As, however, it is broadly accepted that education in any case
also has a signalling value, we will compare whether this signalling value differs between
a distinct group of migrants and non-migrants in the German labour market. To the best
4 In general, the coefﬁcients obtained from the IV estimates are higher. However, as pointed out in the
article this may be because the IV estimator depends crucially on the assumption that the instruments
are uncorrelated with other latent characteristics of individuals that may affect their earnings. In addition,
measurement error in the schooling variable causes a downward bias in OLS estimates (see Griliches 1977
or Angrist/Krueger 1991) but not necessarily in IV estimates.
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on the starting wage of a person, i.e. at a time when the employer cannot observe (much)
more than the researcher. At this stage of the wage-bargaining process, the education level
acts as a signal about the expected productivity of a potential employee. This means that
it contains the sum of productivity enhancing effects due to education and the expected
characteristics (which indirectly affect productivity) that are associated with such education
levels.
Our paper is structured as follows: In the next section we present the theoretical model
from which we derive our hypothesis that we then want to test empirically. We describe our
data in Section 3 before presenting the estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 provides
our conclusions.
2 Screening with Productivity Enhancing Effects of Education
Starting point of the analysis is a general theoretical model of screening with productivity
enhancing effects of education (cf. Hirshleifer/Riley 1992: ch. 11). We assume that there
are two types of individuals which differ with respect to their innate abilities p, where p = H
denotes high and p = L denotes low ability, i.e. H > L. Net utility of an individual is
U (w;s;) = w   C (s;) (1)
For simplicity, net utility U is assumed to increase linearly in the wage w and decrease in
the perceived cost of education C. As usual, this perceived cost increases convexly with
the signalled level of education s and decreases with innate ability . Hence, individuals
with a higher innate ability require a smaller increment in income to be willing to increase
their education level. This also implies that high ability individuals have ﬂatter indifference
curves in the (s;w)-space.
It is often assumed in sorting models that education only has a signalling value and no
direct effect on productivity. However, there is no reason and no need for this assumption
(see, for example, Spence 1974, Weiss 1983, Lang 1994). With such productivity enhan-
cing effects of education, the net value of production  of a ﬁrm also depends on both s
and . Hence, the net value of production can be written as
 (w;s;) = P (s;)   w (2)
where P (s;) denotes the marginal product of a worker with an education signal s and an
innate ability .
Figure 1 shows the equilibria when there are two types of workers who differ in their innate
abilities. If the types are observably distinct, i.e. we have perfect information, their equilib-




H) shown by points A and B, respectively. In these
points, the respective zero-proﬁt (i.e. we assume perfect competition as usual) and indif-
ference curves are tangential. In this case, with perfect information, there is no signalling
effect, i.e. the signal s simply reﬂects the productivity level of an applicant. Hence, no party
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Figure 1: Perfect Information Contracts with Two Types of Workers
could improve its position without either a decrease in utility or losses by the ﬁrms. At the
same time, as points A and B are utility-maximising, high (low) productivity workers will
never signal an education level below s
H (s
L).
If the two types cannot be distinguished by the employer, i.e. we have imperfect information,
type L workers would prefer a type H contract in which their indifference curve would
then go through point B which is associated with a higher net utility level. However, ﬁrms
would make a loss if they paid both type L and H workers the high productivity wage w
H.




Figure 2 shows the case of a separating equilibrium with imperfect information. In order to
prevent type L-workers from mimicking the workers with a high innate ability, ﬁrms will now
continue to offer type L workers the contract (s
L;w
L). However, the contract for type H
workers is now (ss
H;ws
H), i.e. in going from an equilibrium with perfect to one with imperfect
information, high-ability workers have to invest more in education to separate themselves
and move from point B to point C in Figure 2. With such a contract pair, type L workers
are just indifferent between contracts A and C. Hence, high-ability workers have to signal
marginally above ss
H in order to really separate themselves from the low-ability workers.
The type H workers incur a negative externality, as they need to invest in a higher signal
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Figure 2: Imperfect Information Separating Contracts for Two Types of Workers
However, as shown in Figure 3, depending on the relative productivities (and shares of the
two types of workers), a separating solution may not represent an equilibrium. For example,
both types of workers prefer a pooling contract with wages of or above ~ wHL. If the average
productivity of the two types of workers is higher than this wage, then the scope of possible
pooling contracts is given by the shaded area BCD in Figure 3. As an educational level of
at least s
H is required to reach the productivity level at which ﬁrms can pay ~ wHL without
making a loss, this signalling-level marks the lower bound of the shaded area. The upper
bound is again the signal Ss
H as this is the level after which typ-L workers would then prefer
a separating contract.
However, Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) show that – with competition amongst ﬁrms – it is no
longer possible to determine a unique pooling equilibrium which is stable. This can be seen
from Figure 4 which is an enlargement of the relevant area in Figure 3. For example, if one
ﬁrm were to offer a contract as shown by point D, then another ﬁrm could offer a contract
to the north-east of D such as the wage-signal combination shown by point Q, in which
both type H and L workers reach a higher utility. The range for such pooling equilibria
is limited to the right by U0
L, i.e. the indifference curve of the type L-workers which goes
through D, the lowest possible wage-signal-combination in which there would be a pooling
equilibrium. However, point Q cannot be a stable pooling equilibrium, as ﬁrms could react
and offer a contract-point R. As compared to D, type H workers would increase but type
L workers decrease their utility level. Therefore, only the high-ability workers would prefer
this contract. In this case, the competitor originally offering the contract point Q would
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Figure 3: Imperfect Information with Pooling Contract for Two Types of Workers
now make a loss as only the low-ability individuals would stay in the ﬁrm with productivities
below the wage associated with Q. At the same time, ﬁrms offering R would make positive
proﬁts as they only employ high-ability workers with productivities higher than the wage
associated with R. Even if then another ﬁrm were to offer a higher wage than the reactive
ﬁrm, the ﬁrm paying R would “only” lose its workers and end up making zero proﬁts but
would not incur any losses. Therefore, in the potential pooling equilibria range BDU0
L,
there is always the possibility for competitors to react by offering new contracts which
make the original offers unproﬁtable. Engers/Fernandez (1987) show that in such a case
there will only be one unique “reactive equilibrium” and that in this equilibrium there will be
offered two separate contracts for the two types of workers. Hence, no pooling equilibria
can exist and there is only the separating equilibrium as originally shown by points A and
C in Figure 2.
A very important conclusion out of this theoretical analysis for the following empirical re-
search is that, in contrast to many models of imperfect information, in our case there is
no room for both pooling and separating equilibria. As we showed that only one separat-
ing equilibrium can exist, we should observe separating behaviour on the labour market.
Hence, we derive the following four hypothesis which we want to test empirically:
1. There is always either a separating or reactive equilibrium, i.e. there will always be
different contracts for people with different signal levels. Hence, we expect that the
coefﬁcients for the various education levels differ signiﬁcantly. This should hold both














Figure 4: Imperfect Information with Pooling Contract and Reactive Equilibrium for Two
Types of Workers
for the Ethnic as well as native Germans.
2. If employers associate a lower productivity with foreign degrees than for degrees
obtained in the home country, then their zero-proﬁt curves will be lower for foreign
education signals.5 In this case, a person with a degree from abroad will receive
a lower wage than a person with the same formal degree stemming from the home
country.
3. If it is true that low-skilled occupations do not require formal qualiﬁcations, we expect
that the wages associated with the low-ability individuals (i.e. people who invest in
the lowest education signal which in the empirical research below is equivalent to “no
vocational training”) be the same. Hence, we want to the test whether the coefﬁcient
of the low-education signal is the same across the two groups.
4. If both hypothesis 2. and 3. hold, then the difference in the coefﬁcients between low-
and high-skilled Native Germans should be higher than the corresponding difference
for the Ethnic Germans.
5 This attitude could be caused for example by risk-averse employers or by experience from past hirings.
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Until recently, in ofﬁcial German statistics only the nationality was recorded. As Ethnic
Germans obtain the German nationality as soon as they migrate to Germany, this meant
that it was more or less impossible to identify them in ofﬁcial statistics. Hence, research
used either the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) or qualitative research methods
to analyse this migration group. However, the GSOEP does not contain enough labour-
market information for our purposes. Particularly, the GSOEP is an annual household
panel. Hence, it is not possible to identify all new jobs a person begins within a year.
However, as will be made clearer below, it is the starting wage in a new job which is of
primary interest here.
Instead, we use the rich administrative data set from the German Federal Employment
Agency (FEA) for our analysis. This data is converted to the so-called “Integrated Em-
ployment Biographies” (Integrierte Erwerbsbiograﬁe – IEB) by the Institute for Employment
Research, Germany which is afﬁliated with the FEA. With this data it is possible to observe
all times in which a person is:
either registered as unemployed or as a job-seeker (who can, for example, be simul-
taneously employed),
is entitled to welfare beneﬁts administered by the FEA,
participates in an active labour-market programme administered by the FEA,
is employed either in a job which is liable to social-security contributions or in a so-
called “Mini-Job” in which the individual earns a maximum of 400 e per month without
having to pay social-security contributions.
Thus, with this data set we are able to observe on a daily basis the transition from either
unemployment or programme participation to a new job, or if a person remains employed
but changes the company.
We use this data set to create a completely new database for Ethnic Germans which over-
comes the difﬁculties mentioned above with the other data on this migration group. Within
the IEB there are several means of identifying Ethnic Germans:
1. A person is registered unemployed or as a job-seeker after January 1st. 2000.6
2. A person receives “Eingliederungsgeld” – a special welcome payment to Ethnic Ger-
mans.7
6 To a certain extent, we are also able to identify Ethnic Germans via this method who were unemployed
prior to this date. However, this is only the case if the “customer number” used internally can be uniquely
linked to an individual. Often this number was deleted in the records once the person had found a job and
subsequently given to a different person. As of January 1st. 2000, the customer number is always unique.
7 In fact, migrants from the former East Germany were also eligible to this payment. However, we can explicitly
differentiate between these and Ethnic Germans as we only use this identiﬁcation strategy if the payment
was made after July 1st 1990, a time at which it was no longer made to people coming from former East
Germany.
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mans.
We only need to identify a person as an Ethnic German by one of these methods and at
one point in time. As a person always has the same “customer-number” in all spells of the
data, it is then simply possible to transmit the information containing the migration status
to all other spells of that person.
As our dataset is completely new, we need to see how representative it is for the group
of Ethnic Germans. Since for 2005 it is possible to at least estimate the number of Ethnic
Germans using the German microcensus (the yearly 1 % ofﬁcial household survey in Ger-
many), we compare the number of 25 to under 55 year olds (the age group of interest in
our subsequent analysis) as measured by the microcensus with the number of Ethnic Ger-
mans we are able to identify for this age group using our dataset. This is shown in Table 1.
As can be seen from the Table, we manage to identify a very high percentage of the Ethnic
Table 1: Number of 25 to under 55 year olds in the IEB and Microcensus
Number Coverage
IEB Microcensus 2005 Rate
(1990 – 2004) (1949 – 2005) (in %)
972083 1090378 89.2
Germans. It needs to be noted though that the comparison needs to be interpreted with
caution. First, Ethnic Germans are not unambiguously identiﬁable in the Microcensus so
that the ﬁgure is based on estimations using this data.8 Second, the number of people are
counted in 2004 in the IEB but in 2005 in the microcensus. Third, in the IEB we can only
identify Ethnic Germans migrating in 1990 or later whereas the microcensus also counts
people immigrating as far back as 1949. Hence, although a perfect comparison cannot be
made, the coverage rate is so high that we feel sure that we have a representative and
almost complete sample of the Ethnic Germans.
In the following, we compare the signalling effects of education between Ethnic and Native
Germans. For this purpose, we use our data on the Ethnic Germans as described above
and, in order to obtain a ﬁle which is still manageable, we use a representative subsample
of 2 % of all Native Germans actively participating on the German labour market in the
same age group.
As stated in the introduction, we are interested in measuring the value associated with
different educational signals for the two groups we are considering: Ethnic and Native
Germans. Therefore, our focus is looking on the starting wage of a person, i.e. at a
time when the employer cannot observe (much) more than the researcher. At this stage
of the wage-bargaining process, the education level acts as a signal about the expected
productivity of a potential employee. This means that it contains the sum of productivity
enhancing effects due to education and the expected characteristics that are associated
with such education levels.
8 We thank Holger Seibert from the IAB for performing this estimation for us.
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in the same year, the average is simply calculated as gross wage income divided by the
number of days worked for the employer.9 If the employment spell ends in a later year, then
the average is calculated with regard to the income and number of days worked in the year
in which the employment spell started.10 This means that we face a trade-off with regard
to the time length in which we consider the wage to be a “starting-wage”: The shorter we
deﬁne the time interval, the less people will be in our sample. However, the longer we
choose this period to be, the more our wage might differ from that paid at the beginning.
Here, we base our wage on a maximum of the ﬁrst six months of an employment spell.11
The means of calculating the average daily wage leads to two potential cases which we
observe: Either the person starts a new job towards the end of a year, i.e. during the
last six months of a year, or the job begins and ends within one year and only lasts for a
maximum of six months. However, the latter case with only relatively short job durations
is likely to be a special subsample of new jobs. Therefore, to begin with, we restrict our
analysis to jobs starting in the second half of the year and will later investigate whether this
has an effect on the results.
We identify starting wages either if a person has a prior unemployment spell or is partici-
pating in an active labour-market programme. If a person directly moves from one job to
the next then we can identify this change by a change in the plant number. However, we
are not able to tell whether this new job is with a new company or simply a new job with the
old company but at a different location. Hence, we impose the restriction that there must
be a gap of at least one day between job to job changes.12
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of how this wage is distributed across the
education levels as well as between Ethnic and Native Germans.13
It can immediately be seen from the table that there are marked differences between the
two groups. The mean starting wage of highly qualiﬁed Ethnic Germans is more than
40 % lower than the corresponding wage for the Native Germans. Also the distribution of
the educational levels differs substantially. There are (in relative terms) more than twice
as many Ethnic Germans with no vocational training. The share of Native Germans with a
university degree is more than 1.5 times higher.
Information on educational degrees is also of great importance for our analysis. This infor-
9 The annual or monthly wages used to calculate the average are in fact right-censored as only a wage up
to the maximum contribution to the social security system is considered. However, less than two percent of
our sample where affected by this restriction. Performing censored regression analysis does not alter the
ﬁndings. We also drop spells from our analysis in which the daily wage is less than 20,- e. as this implies
a monthly wage of under 400,- e. Such so-called “Mini-Jobs” are subject to special regulations.
10 For administrative reasons, every employer has to make at least one declaration per year to the social
security system for each employee. Hence, if an employee works for the same ﬁrm for several years, then
in the ﬁrst year the average is only calculated for the days worked in that year. In subsequent years, the
average is calculated based on the annual income in that year and the number of days in the year.
11 We also performed our analysis for starting wages based on three months. This does not alter our results
substantially (cf. Table 6 below).
12 In theory, people changing jobs within one company should not have a gap at all between their employment
spells. However, sometimes employers seem to register their new employees with a minor delay when they
change plants.
13 We deﬁne “university degrees” as degrees from universities and universities of applied studies.
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No vocational Vocational Univ.
training training degree
Ethnic Germans
Mean wage 3.76 3.88 3.99
N 61,002 123,231 14,545
Share (in %) 30.69 61.99 7.32
Native Germans
Mean wage 3.78 3.95 4.42
N 12,225 65,069 10,225
Share (in %) 13.97 74.35 11.68
mation stems from employers. However, as no ﬁnancial payments depend on this report,
it seems to be slightly unreliable (cf. Fitzenberger/Osikominu/Völter 2005). Hence, we use
information about a person´s education level from other spells in the IEB to try and get a
more plausible report on education. More precisely, since a person generally has to show
his certiﬁcates to a placement ofﬁcer at the job center, we use the education information
from unemployment spells and transmit this to all subsequent spells in which education
information is missing. If there is still no information about a person’s educational degree,
we see if there is information in an employment spell and replace as many missings as
possible.
Table 2 highlights the fact, that there are large differences between Ethnic and Native
Germans with respect to the distribution of their educational levels. The share of Ethnic
Germans with no vocational training is more than twice as high as for the Native Germans.
Similarly, the share of Native Germans with a university degree is over 50 % higher than
the share for Ethnic Germans.
When trying to measure the effect of education signals on wage we obviously need to
take further personal and occupational characteristics into account. The main explanatory
variables we include (besides dummies for time and branch of occupation) are age, sex,
labour-market experience, the size of the ﬁrm and the commuting distance. Table 3 shows
how these variables are distributed between the two groups.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Main Exogenous Variables
Total Labour-market Proportion Firm Commuting
Age labour-market experience female size distance
experience in branch
Ethnic Germans
Mean 37.43 2.84 0.45 0.32 235.02 36.31
Std. error of mean 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.63 0.19
Native Germans
Mean 30.89 5.1 0.83 0.40 484.77 52.53
Std. error of mean 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 9.19 0.37
There are two ways by which we control for labour-market experience in Germany. As
Germany in general has a fairly occupationally segregated labour market, we include both
the absolute amount of labour-market experience as well as the amount of labour-market
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We further control for ﬁrm size and local labour-market conditions. As shown in Ammer-
müller/Kuckulenz/Zwick (2006), these conditions can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
wage a person receives. In addition, this effect differs for people of different skill levels.
Hence, we include the local unemployment rate in our regressions.
As it is well known that women generally receive lower wages than men and that large ﬁrms
pay more than smaller ones, we also include these variables in the regression analysis.
In addition, we take the commuting distance into account. On the one hand, longer com-
muting distances might require higher wages as a compensation for the higher travel costs.
On the other hand, commuting might also be a signal as to how motivated an employee is,
i.e. long commuting might signal high motivation.15
Finally, in order to avoid distortions in the wage caused by people working part-time or
participating in a labour-market programme, we will only consider individuals starting full-
time unsubsidised jobs. These are analysed for the time period 2000 to 2004.
4 Results
The aim of this section is to test the theoretical hypothesis listed on page 11. To this extent,
we estimate the following earnings equation:
lnwijt = 1j + 2jeduc2ijt + 3jeduc3ijt + 4jageijt + 5jage2
ijt + 6jlm_expijt
+ 7jlm_exp2
ijt + 8jrel_sec_expijt + 9jfemaleijt + 10jfirm_sizeijt
+ 11junemp_rateijt + 
0
jDijt + uijt (3)
where lnwijt is the log wage of person i in group j at time t. j 2 fE;Ng denotes the
group a person is associated to, i.e. Ethnic German (E) or Native German (N). educ2ijt is
a dummy variable if someone has vocational training and similarly, educ3ijt denotes a uni-
versity degree.16 We include labour-market experience (lm_exp) deﬁned as the total time
of employment in Germany both linearly and quadratically. The variable rel_sec_expijt is
the fraction of time a person has spent in the current branch relative to the total time he or
she has worked in Germany. Finally, we also included the unemployment rate in the com-
munity where the new job starts (unemp_rateijt) to take local labour-market conditions
14 Ideally we would also like to include the branch an Ethnic German worked in (or was trained in) before
he or she immigrated to Germany. As Kreyenfeld/Konietzka (2002) have shown, for Ethnic Germans it
makes a large difference whether they can work in the same sector as in their destination country or not.
Unfortunately, our data does not include information about work or training outside of Germany.
15 The dataset includes the district where a person lives and works. Since many districts are large, we observe
the same district and hence zero commuting distance for over 50 % of our sample. Therefore, we took the
minimum positive commuting distance in our dataset and imposed this ﬁctitious distance for people living
and working in the same district.
16 As shown in the article by Card (2001), usually – at least when testing the human-capital theory – the edu-
cation variable is instrumented for. Unfortunately, the FEA data does not include any suitable instruments
so that we are not able to compare the coefﬁcients using different estimation methods.
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Table 4 shows the results for the case that we restrict the coefﬁcients 4j   11j and the
vector of dummy-variable coefﬁcients 
0
j to be the same for Ethnic and Native Germans. It



















*** Signiﬁcant at the 1%-level
a)Including dummies for branch
and year
can be seen from the table, that in both groups, individuals with higher education signals
than those with no vocational training, have signiﬁcantly higher wages. This difference is
6.9% for people with vocational training and jumps to 22.2% if people have a university
degree. This is in line with our hypothesis 1 from Section 2.
Hypothesis 3 that there should be no difference between the low-qualiﬁed Ethnic and Native
Germans is also conﬁrmed. The coefﬁcient for the natives in Table 4 is not signiﬁcant. This
is the case even though we have a very large sample.
There are, however, signiﬁcant differences between the wages for individuals with voca-
tional training and university degrees between the two groups. The medium-qualiﬁed nat-
ives have around 4% higher wages. The difference for the highly qualiﬁed between the
two groups is much higher at around 34%. This is also in line with the hypothesis 2 from
Section 2.
All other parameters for the control variables have the expected sign and are highly signi-
ﬁcant. For example, the wages for females are roughly 13% lower than those for males
and wages increase with ﬁrm size. Both total labour-market experience and speciﬁc ex-
perience in the current sector exert a positive inﬂuence on the wage. However, there is
17 We also instrumented this variable with its one and two months lag. This does not alter the main results.
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ﬂuence. Hence, given a certain amount of labour-market experience, individuals manage
to increase their wage when they take up new jobs at higher ages. People who com-
mute further also receive higher wages, either as compensation for their higher commuting
costs or perhaps due to the motivation signal mentioned above. Finally, an increase in
the unemployment rate is associated with lower wages, a sign that employees have poorer
bargaining positions in this case. Although not shown in the table, the regression also
included 56 sector and 4 year dummies. These were jointly highly signiﬁcant, respectively.
We performed numerous F and Wald tests with robust or clustered standard errors to see
whether the restriction of equal coefﬁcients 4j   11j and the vector of coefﬁcients 
0
j is
feasible for both groups (Ethnic and Native Germans). All tests rejected this hypothesis, so
that in the following, we will concentrate on results of separate analysis for the two groups
(see Table 5).18
Table 5: Estimation Results of the Unrestricted Model















*** Signiﬁcant at the 1%-level
a)Including dummies for branch and year
The coefﬁcients for the Ethnic Germans are similar to those from Table 4. Medium-skilled
Ethnic Germans have wages which are 6.2% higher than those of Ethnic Germans with
no vocational training. The difference between the latter group and the high-skilled Ethnic
Germans is 22.5%. For the Native Germans the differences are 12% and 53%, respect-
ively.19 This difference is again nearly the same as in Table 4. These ﬁndings are clearly
in support of our hypothesis 1 and 2 from Section 2, i.e., there are signiﬁcant differences
18 An F-Test (with homoscedastic errors) to test whether the parameters for the control variables are identical
for the two groups leads to an F-Value of 71.13 with 69 and 264,666 degrees of freedom and thus rejects the
null-hypothesis at all signiﬁcance levels. The Wald test with robust calculation of the variance-covariance
matrix for the unrestricted model leads to the same result.
19 We also calculated the coefﬁcients for foreigners. The wage differences associated with their educational
signals were always below those of the Native Germans, but well above those of the Ethnic Germans.
Surprisingly, the coefﬁcients of the foreigners were quite close to the coefﬁcients of the Native Germans
and quite different to the coefﬁcients of the Ethnic Germans. However, due to the large heterogeneities
amongst the foreigners, we refrain from presenting the results here.
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Germans with identical (formal) educational signals.
The role that past experience in the same sector as the one in which the new job starts also
differs substantially between the two groups with the effect much stronger for the Native
than the Ethnic Germans. All other control variables remain highly signiﬁcant, have the
same sign and roughly the same magnitude as was the case for the restricted regression
model. Perhaps at ﬁrst glance slightly surprising is the fact that the quadratic age term is
not negative. This is probably due to the fact that only people under 55 are included in
our regressions, an age at which the declining part of the wage-age proﬁle as is usually
observed may not yet have been reached.
It needs to be noted that the wage differences between Ethnic and Native Germans are
only pure sorting effects if the employer has the same amount of information about the
characteristics relevant for the expected productivity of a newly hired worker as the re-
searcher. However, it is possible that, for example, some Ethnic Germans have poorer
language proﬁciency than Native Germans with identical observable characteristics. Unfor-
tunately, our dataset contains no information about language skills whereas the employer
can easily observe this during the job interview. The question is hence how strong lan-
guage proﬁciency inﬂuences the starting wage. Aldashev/Gernandt/Thomsen (2009) show
that migrants speaking mainly German have on average 14 percent higher wages than
those speaking in their native language and 6 percent higher than those who only partly
use German at home. These results are comparable with other studies for Germany. For
example, Dustmann (1994) ﬁnds a 15 percent wage increase for females and a 7 percent
increase for males who report to have good or very good writing abilities in German lan-
guage. The speaking capabilities are of minor impact on the earnings compared to the
writing capabilities. However, even if we assume that Ethnic Germans have poor average
language skills, this can still only explain a part of the big wage differences with the highly
qualiﬁed which we ﬁnd. When Aldashev/Gernandt/Thomsen (2009) additionally consider
the selection into the economic sector and the type of occupation, the direct effect of lan-
guage usage on earnings becomes insigniﬁcant. This, they conclude that while language
ability is an important determinant for the selection processes in the labor market, there is
no discrimination in earnings associated with it.
In a further step we check how robust our results are with respect to different speciﬁcations.
The education coefﬁcients concerning these different speciﬁcations are shown in Table
6. In the ﬁrst line of this table we simply repeat the coefﬁcients from Table 5 for better
comparability.
The unrestricted model includes age and labour-market experience both linearly and quad-
ratically. Lines 2 and 3 of Table 6 show the education coefﬁcients for two different ap-
proaches using an unchanged dataset: In the linear speciﬁcation we omit both the quad-
ratic terms and in the log-linear speciﬁcation we use the (natural) logarithm of age and
labour-market experience as arguments. As one can see, the general picture remains the
same.
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Ethnic Germans Native Germans
voc. training univ. degree voc. training univ. degree
Unrestr. model 0.062*** 0.225*** 0.124*** 0.534***
Linear-speciﬁcation 0.069*** 0.231*** 0.131*** 0.551***
Log-linear-speciﬁcation 0.071*** 0.226*** 0.115*** 0.523***
Including short-job-spells 0.061*** 0.221*** 0.125*** 0.528***
3-month wage 0.052*** 0.211*** 0.116*** 0.541***
3-day gap 0.059*** 0.215*** 0.118*** 0.513***
10,- Eur. limit 0.073*** 0.234*** 0.203*** 0.624***
2-year stay 0.084*** 0.280***
Robust standard errors
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1%-level
Lines 4 to 8 of Table 6 show the education coefﬁcients for robustness tests which imply
variations in the dataset. Firstly, instead of only including jobs which started in the second
half of a year to make sure that we do not just have short jobs in our sample, we include all
jobs for which we observe the wage for up to six months in a particular year, i.e. we also
include jobs which begin and end in the same year and hence only last a maximum of six
months. As can be seen from Table 6, this only has marginal effects on the levels of the
coefﬁcients and no effects on their signiﬁcance levels.
Although we assume that often the wage changes after six months when the probation
period ends, we also tested a model speciﬁcation where the starting wage is only based
on a maximum of three months (and for the same reason as above, we only looked at jobs
which started in the ﬁnal three months of a year). Again, there are only small effects on the
education coefﬁcients.
The next robustness check which we perform is to vary the number of days that must be
between two jobs one person has. We argued above that a gap of one day should be
sufﬁcient to be able to ﬁlter out those people changing jobs within one company from those
starting new jobs at new companies. To test whether our results depend on this assump-
tion, we also include the results when we increase this gap to three days. This reduces the
coefﬁcients slightly but does not change any of our main ﬁndings or the signiﬁcance levels
of the coefﬁcients.
As mentioned in Section 3, in the unrestricted model we omit spells with starting wages
below 20,- e from our analysis. In a further robustness check, we lower this wage limit and
only omit new jobs with starting wages under 10,- e. Here we observe upward differences
of the education coefﬁcients particularly for Native Germans. This is caused by the fact that
because of lowering the wage limit the share of people without vocational training increases
substantially especially for Native Germans, i.e. for Native Germans from 14.0% to 39.7%
and for Ethnic Germans from 30.7% to 42.6%.
It could be argued that Ethnic Germans need a certain amount of time once they have
arrived in Germany to orientate themselves. To take this fact into account, in the last ro-
bustness modiﬁcation of the unrestricted model we only looked at spells of Ethnic Germans
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coefﬁcients do indeed increase, but are still well below the values for Native Germans.
All in all, the additional regression results presented in Table 6 show that the basic scenario
presented before is very robust. Increasing coefﬁcients for both Ethnic and Native Germans
occur especially if jobs with starting wages from 10,- e are included. In addition, only
including those Ethnic Germans which have been in Germany for at least two years also
leads to an increase in their education coefﬁcients. However, even in these cases, the
empirical results still conﬁrm the theoretical hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the effects of education signals for Ethnic Germans and Germans
without a migration background (“Native Germans”). Ethnic Germans are an important
immigration group in Germany for two reasons: First, with roughly 2.5 million migrating to
Germany between 1990 and 2004, they represent a “large” immigration group. Second,
due to their German roots, they gain German citizenship upon migration into Germany
and hence – unlike other groups of migrants – unrestricted access to the German labour
market.
We base our analysis on a sorting model with productivity enhancing effects of education.
Hence, we do not test whether the sorting or human-capital theory is valid. Instead, we
compare whether this signalling value differs signiﬁcantly between a distinct group of mi-
grants and non-migrants in the German labour market. We ﬁrst show theoretically that
only a separating equilibrium can exist. This has several implications for our empirical ana-
lysis. First, we expect signiﬁcant differences between the effects of low-, medium- and high
educational signals on wages irrespective of whether they are Ethnic or Native Germans.
Second, if employers associate a lower productivity with foreign degrees than for degrees
obtained in the home country, then a person with a degree from abroad will receive a lower
wage than a person with the same formal degree stemming from the home country. Third,
if it is true that low-skilled occupations do not require formal qualiﬁcations, we expect that
the wages associated with low educational signal individuals be the same. Fourth and ﬁ-
nally, if the former two hypothesis hold, then the difference in the coefﬁcients between low-
and high-skilled Native Germans should be higher than the corresponding difference for
the Ethnic Germans.
As most datasets do not allow us to identify Ethnic Germans as they only record nationality,
we test these hypothesis using a completely new and extremely rich dataset based on ad-
ministrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency. We ﬁnd empirical support
for all four hypothesis. In addition, we test how robust our conclusions are with respect to
different model speciﬁcations and econometric methods. All four hypothesis continue to
hold, irrespective of which variation we tried.
Although many papers have shown that migrants, deﬁned as foreigners, generally fare less
well on the German labour market than natives do, this paper clearly highlights the fact that
IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2009 22this also holds for one group of migrants which has not been analysed in as much detail
and which has completely unrestricted access to the German labour market.
IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2009 23References
Alba-Ramirez, A.; Segundo, M. (1995): Returns to Education in Spain. In: Economics of
Education Review, Vol. 14, pp. 155–166.
Albrecht, J. W. (1981): A Procedure for Testing the Signalling Hypothesis. In: Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 123–132.
Albrecht, James W.; van Ours, Jan C. (2006): Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the
Educational Signaling Hypothesis. In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3,
pp. 361–372.
Aldashev, Alisher; Gernandt, Johannes; Thomsen, Stephan L. (2009): Language Usage,
Participation, Employment and Earnings – Evidence for Foreigners in West Germany with
Multiple Sources of Selection. In: Labour Economics, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 330–341.
Aldashev, Alisher; Gernandt, Johannes; Thomsen, Stephan L. (2007): Earnings Prospects
for People with Migration Background in Germany. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 07-031,
Mannheim.
Ammermüller, Andreas; Kuckulenz, Anja; Zwick, Thomas (2006): Aggregate Unemploy-
ment Decreases Individual Returns to Education. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 06-034, Man-
nheim.
Angrist, Joshua D.; Krueger, Alan B. (1991): Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect
Schooling and Earnings? In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. p979 –
1014.
Arabsheibani, G. R. (1989): The Wiles Test Revisited. In: Economics Letters, Vol. 29, pp.
361–364.
Arabsheibani, G. R.; Rees, H. (1998): On the Weak vs. Strong Version of the Screening
Hypothesis: A Re-examination of the P-test for the UK. In: Economics of Education Review,
Vol. 17, pp. 189–192.
Becker, Gary S. (1975): Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special
Reference to Education. New York: Columbia University Press, 2. ed..
Brown, S.; Sessions, J. G. (1999): Education and Employment Status: A Test of the Strong
Screening Hypothesis in Italy. In: Economics of Education Review, Vol. 18, pp. 397–404.
Brown, S.; Sessions, J. G. (1998): Education, Employment Status and Earnings: A Com-
parative Test of the Strong Screening Hypothesis. In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 45, pp. 586–591.
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2007): Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland. Zeitreihen bis 2006.
Card, David (2001): Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent
Econometric Problems. In: Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 1127–1160.
Castagnetti, Carolina; Chelli, Francesco; Rosti, Luisa (2005): Educational Performance as
Signalling Device: Evidence from Italy. In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 9, pp. 1–7.
IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2009 24Cohn, Elchanan; Kiker, B. F.; Mendes de Oliveira, M. (1987): Further Evidence on the
Screening Hypothesis. In: Economics Letters, Vol. 25, pp. 289–294.
Constant, A.; Massey, D. S. (2003): Labor Market Segmentation and the Earnings of Ger-
man Guestworkers. IZA Discussion Paper No. 774, Bonn.
Dustmann, Christian (1994): Speaking Fluency, Writing Fluency and Earnings of Migrants.
In: Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 133–156.
Engers, Maxim; Fernandez, Luis (1987): Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and
Self-Selection. In: Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 425–439.
Fang, Hanming (2006): Disentangling the College Wage Premium: Estimating a Model
with Endogenous Education Choices. In: International Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 4,
pp. 1151–1185.
Fitzenberger, Bernd; Osikominu, Aderonke; Völter, Robert (2005): Imputation Rules to
Improve the Education Variable in the IAB Employment Subsample. FDZ Methodenreport
No. 3/2005, Nürnberg.
Fredland, J. E.; Little, R. D. (1981): Self-employed Workers: Returns to Education and
Training. In: Economics of Education Review, Vol. 1, pp. 315–337.
Garcia-Mainar, I.; Montuenga-Gómez, V. M. (2005): Education Returns of Wage Earners
and Self-employed Workers: Portugal vs. Spain. In: Economics of Education Review,
Vol. 24, pp. 161–170.
Gebel, Michael; Pfeiffer, Friedhelm (2007): Educational Expansion and its Heterogeneous
Returns for Wage Workers. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 07-010, Mannheim.
Griliches, Zvi (1977): Estimating Returns to Schooling: Some Econometric Problems. In:
Econometrica, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 1–22.
Grubb, W. N. (1993): Further Tests of Screening on Educatio and Observed Ability. In:
Economics of Education Review, Vol. 12, pp. 125–136.
Hirshleifer, Jack; Riley, John G. (1992): The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katz, E.; Ziderman, A. (1980): On education, Screening and Human Capital. In: Economics
Letters, Vol. 6, pp. 81–88.
Kreyenfeld, Michaela; Konietzka, Dirk (2002): The Performance of Migrants in Occupa-
tional Labour Markets. Evidence from Aussiedler in Germany. In: European Societies,
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 53–78.
Kreyenfeld, Michaela; Konietzka, Dirk (2001): The Transferability of Educational Creden-
tials - The Case of Ethnic German Migrants in the German Labor Market. Working Paper
2001-002, Max Planck Institute for Dempgraphic Research, Rostock.
Lang, Kevin (1994): Does the Human-Capital/Educational-Sorting Debate Matter for De-
velopment Policy? In: American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 353–358.
IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2009 25Lee, K. H. (1980): Screening, Ability and Productivity of Education in Malaysia. In: Eco-
nomics Letters, Vol. 5, pp. 189–193.
Licht, G.; Steiner, V. (1994): Assimilation, Labour Markte Experience and Earnings Proﬁles
of Temporary and Permanent Immigrant Workers in Germany. In: Internationale Review of
Applied Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 130–156.
Liu, P. W.; Wong, Y. C. (1982): Educational Screening by Certiﬁcates: An Empirical Test.
In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 20, pp. 72–83.
Lofstrom, Magnus (2000): A Comparison of the Human Capital and Signaling Models: The
Case of the Self-Employed and the Increase in the Schooling Premium in the 1980s. IZA
Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP No. 160, Bonn.
Miller, Paul W.; Mulvey, Charles; Martin, Nick (2004): A Test of the Sorting Model of Edu-
cation in Australia. In: Economics of Education Review, Vol. 23, pp. 473–482.
Miller, Paul W.; Mulvey, Charles; Martin, Nick (1995): What Do Twins Studies Reveal about
the Economic Returns to Education? A Comparison of Australian and U.S. Findings. In:
American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 586–599.
Miller, Paul W.; Volker, P. A. (1984): The Screening Hypothesis: An Application of the Wiles
Test. In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 22, pp. 121–127.
Psacharopoulos, G. (1983): Education and Private versus Public Sector Pay. In: Labour
and Society, Vol. 8, pp. 123–134.
Psacharopoulos, G. (1979): On the Weak versus the Strong Version of the Screening
Hypothesis. In: Economics Letters, Vol. 4, pp. 181–185.
Reinberg, Alexander; Hummel, Markus (2007): Schwierige Fortschreibung: Der Trend
bleibt – Geringqualiﬁzierte sind häuﬁger arbeitslos. IAB Kurzbericht No. 18/2007, Nürn-
berg.
Riley, John G. (1979): Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis. In: Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, Vol. 87, No. 7, pp. S227–S252.
Riphahn, R. (2005): Are there Diverging Time Trends in the Educational Attainment of
Nationals and Second Generation Immigrants? In: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und
Statistik, Vol. 225, pp. 325–346.
Riphahn, R. (2003): Cohort Effects in the Educational Attainment of Second Generation
Immigrants in Germany: An Analysis of Census Data. In: Journal of Population Economics,
Vol. 16, pp. 711–737.
Riphahn, R. (2002): Bruttoeinkommensverteilung in Deutschland 1984 - 1999 und Un-
gleichheit unter ausländischen Erwerbstätigen. DIW Discussion Paper No. 272, Berlin.
Rothschild, Michael; Stiglitz, Joseph (1976): Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 629–649.
IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2009 26Spence, Michael A. (1974): Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related
Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Spence, Michael A. (1973): Job Market Signalling. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 87, pp. 355–374.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2007): Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Bevölkerung mit Mi-
grationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005. Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2, Wies-
baden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Tucker, I. B. (1986): Evidence on the Weak and the Stron Versions of the Screening Hypo-
thesis in the United States. In: Economics Letters, Vol. 21, pp. 391–394.
Tucker, I. B. (1985): Use of Decomposition Technique to Test the Educational Screening
Hypothesis. In: Economics of Education Review, Vol. 4, pp. 321–326.
van der Sluis, J.; van Praag, C. M. (2004): Economic Returns to Education for Entrepren-
eurs: The Development of a Neglected Child in the Family of Economics of Education. In:
Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 11, pp. 1–42.
Weiss, Andrew (1995): Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages. In: Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, pp. 133–154.
Weiss, Andrew (1983): A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education. In: Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 420–442.
Wiles, P. (1974): The Correlation between Education and Earnings: The External-test-not-
content (ETNC) hypothesis. In: Higher Education, Vol. 31, pp. 43–58.
Wolpin, Kenneth I. (1977): Education and Screening. In: American Economic Review,
Vol. 67, No. 5, pp. 949–958.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2004): Estimating Average Partial Effects under Conditional Mo-
ment Independence Assumptions. CEMMAP Working Papers CWP03/04, London.
IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2009 27Recently published 
No.  Author(s)  Title  Date 
43/2008  Hofmann, B.  Work Incentives? Ex-Post Effects of Unemploy-
ment Insurance Sanctions : Evidence from West 
Germany 
12/08 
44/2008 Büttner,  Th. 
Rässler, S. 
Multiple Imputation of Right-Censored Wages in 
the German IAB Employment Sample Consider-
ing Heteroscedasticity 
12/08 
1/2009 Bruckmeier,  K. 
Schwengler, B. 
The Impact of federal social policies on spatial 
income inequalities in Germany : Empirical evi-
dence from social security data 
1/09 




Occupational Upgrading and the Business Cycle 
in West Germany 
1/09 
3/2009 Donado,  A. 
Wälde, K. 
Trade Unions Go Global!  1/09 
4/2009 Schanne,  N. 
Weyh, A. 
What makes start-ups out of unemployment dif-
ferent? 
1/09 






Design and stratification of PASS : A New Panel 
Study for Research on Long Term Unemploy-
ment 
3/09 
6/2009  Ruppe, K.  Eingliederungszuschüsse und Betriebszugehö-
rigkeitsdauer in Westdeutschland 
4/09 
7/2009  Krug, G.  Fehlende Daten beim Record Linkage von Pro-
zess- und Befragungsdaten: Ein empirischer 
Vergleich ausgewählter Missing Data Techniken 
5/09 
8/2009  Kunz, M.  Disparities, persistence and dynamics of regional 
unemployment rates in Germany 
5/09 
9/2009  Stephan, G.  Employer wage subsidies and wages in  




What makes a ‘Jack-of-all-Trades’?  6/09 
11/2009  Kunz, M.  Unemployment dynamics in West Germany: Do 
districts adjust differently than larger regional 
units? 
6/09 
12/2009 Gartner,  H. 
Merkl, Ch. 
Rothe, Th. 
They are even larger! More (on) puzzling labor 
market volatilities 
6/09 




Do more placement officers lead to lower unem-
ployment? Evidence from Germany 
7/09 
As per:  22.07.2009 




Institute for Employment Research 








Reproduction and distribution in any form, also in parts, 
requires the permission of IAB Nuremberg
Website
http://www.iab.de
Download of this Discussion Paper
http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2009/dp1409.pdf
For further inquiries contact the author:
Rüdiger Wapler
Phone  +49.711.941 1451
E-mail  rüdiger.wapler@iab.de 